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Abstract. A continuously evolving geography requires a good under-
standing in networks. As such, this paper accounts for theories and
applications of complex networks and their role both in geography in
general, as well as in determining various geographical network trajecto-
ries. It assesses how links between agents lead to an evolutionary process
of network retention, as well as network variation, and how geography
influences these mechanisms.
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1 Introduction
The limited insight offered by the neoclassical growth theory [1] pertaining both
regional growth [2,3] and geographical agglomeration [4,5,6,7] has brought forth
completely new approaches to economic geography [8,9]. Integrating both growth
theories and endogenous explanations pertaining to regional economy develop-
ment [10,11,12], valuable insight is thus gained by economic geographers. Shift-
ing their attention towards the understanding of geographical proximity of both
technological and economical innovations [13], geographers are interested in un-
derstanding how innovation is made and why innovative practice often concen-
trates in certain geographical proximities [7].
As a result, one way of analyzing certain regional economical developments
[14] is to apply network science and identify certain interactions in generated
economic network. As such, geographers – especially the ones from the economic
department – have become gradually receptive to network science, due to its
various applications in analyzing economic outcomes [15,16]. Just like evolution-
ary economics, network theory uses regional clusters to study various conditions
and outcomes in a dynamic fashion [17]. In the dynamic field of geography, net-
works have been applied with success over the course of many years already
and have coined specific terminologies pertaining geographical clusters and even
globalization.
Following a critical review published by economic geographer Gernot Grabher
[18], it has come to the attention however, that the application of network science
in the field of geography has been done either superficially or selectively. As such,
in this paper we address the development of network science and its application
in geography. Using emerging research on network evolution [19,20], we aim at
integrating concepts into the field of economic geography. As a result, we propose
the following objectives:
– Define a geographical network trajectory [21] which incorporates the appli-
cation of network science in order to study the evolution of networks across
regions.
– Analyze retention-, and variation-mechanisms in network structures which
are endogenous to network evolution.
– Determine models of variation in network trajectories by taking into consid-
eration various regional innovations.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the contribution of network theory
to an evolutionary economic geography, as well as to prove that innovation and
regional growth results from the bridging of several (unconnected) networks. As
such, after addressing basic concepts in section 2, section 3 presents the exist-
ing mechanisms responsible for selection-, retention-, and variation-mechanisms.
Conclusively, section 4 ends this paper with a general discussion pertaining
sources of innovation for regional growth.
2 Theoretical Background
In this section we offer theoretical background pertaining social network analysis
and its application in geography, with particular focus on the economic side of
it.
2.1 Social Network Analysis
Social network analysis is the process of investigating various social structures by
using networks and graph theory [22]. As such, a social network is a construction
formed by individuals (actors, agents) with bidirectional connections (relation-
ships, friendships) between them, effectively resembling a real-world structure of
our own society. Social networks derive from complex networks, together with
which they form part of the nascent field of network science [23,24], ever since
their first introduction to literature in the 1970’s [25]. Based on graph theory
and network theory, empirical observations of real-world networks and sociology,
their main purpose is to model the various relationships from our own society.
Underpinned by empirical studies of real-world systems, complex networks
have gained increased interest due to their applicability in various social [26,27,28]
and scientific fields, such as biology, economy [29] and geography [30]. For in-
stance, in the economic area it is highly important to understand the mechanism
in which certain economic agents handle better than others [31].
2.2 Geography
The field of geography can be linked to complex networks by factoring in two
main properties, namely proximity and place, both very important views of
geography when taking into consideration the concept of geographical network
trajectory.
Proximity, a latent effect of various economic processes, influences network
formation in a direct manner; as such, the most widely used approach in eco-
nomic geography aims at addressing this issue. It is directly influenced by two
underlying social technologies present throughout all existing relations of eco-
nomic geography, namely communication technology [32] and transport technol-
ogy [33]. As such, only by analyzing communication preferences of social actors
and mobility opportunities can we also determine the existing relation between
physical space and economic interaction; in other words, constraints of proxim-
ity only apply if face-to-face is the only means of communication while travel is
denied.
By using the notion of resource bundle from the theory of the growth [34],
a place – the second property by which we can establish a link between net-
works and geography – can be considered both a resource and opportunity. As
such, a place-specific resource offers a source of contextuality, difference and
contingency for economic development [35,36]. Conclusively, by taking into con-
sideration structural (e.g., social capital, structural holes, etc.), material, social
and economical resources, places do not coerce the formation of a given network,
but various social interactions do influence the geography (of the network) [10].
2.3 Geographical network trajectory
The main focus of any theory pertaining network evolution is how structural lay-
out of a given network at time 1 affects the interactions among agents (nodes)
and/or the formation of new relationships (ties) at time 2 [37]. As such, the
concept that combines network, geography and evolution in order to analyze
the above scenario is the geographical network trajectory [38]. It describes from
a geographic point of view the formation and dissolution of relationships (ties)
within a given network. This perspective effectively shifts the analysis of single
relations to the analysis of the overall relations from within a network. As such,
a theory behind network evolution takes into consideration not only the appear-
ance of a new tie, but also the impact that the system imposes on the creation
of additional relationships.
3 The evolutionary process in geographical network
trajectory
A given evolutionary system can be defined by the following principles: selection,
retention as well as variation [39,40]. As such, in the following sub-sections we
present these principles in the context of network theory.
3.1 Selection
The selection mechanism is based on environment. In the field of economics,
for instance, it is the market competition that dictates the existence and layout
of various producers [41]. In field of social network analysis however, selection
refers to the presence of relationships (ties) between agents (nodes) of the same
network [42,43,44,45,46,47]. This selection is the result not only of an external
environment, but also of the various decisions made by the mutual agents linked
together. This implies that the selection mechanism is based on both the re-
quirement of constant adaptation, as well on a strategy focused on improving
the relations between both agents, to the point of mutual benefit.
In all economical networks new relationships occur either between two pro-
ducers who already have a shared history, or new producers, without any previ-
ous relationships. As such, a theory of network evolution must take into consid-
eration both the emergence of dynamic links, as well as possible disappearance
of these; both cases imply the presence of another factor, namely cost.
Creating and/or maintaining relations is a costly resource, and is greatly
dependent on each producer as a limiting factor. As such, producers analyze
the presence of relations mainly from a utility perspective, and how they would
benefit from it. One such benefit would be the possibility of accessing external
resources [48]; this, however, would also automatically decrease the producers’
attractiveness for new relations. In this case, tie selection can be defined as the
competitive allocation of limited relationships where the presence of such a rela-
tionship automatically implies possible lost opportunities. This suggests that tie
selection is a competitive process which hinges on both exogenous changes (e.g.,
regulatory markets) [49] as well as endogenous dynamics (e.g., one producer has
become more attractive because of its alliance with a third party) [50,51]. In
what follows, we further address these two mechanisms, with focus on endoge-
nous mechanisms of network evolution like retention and variation of network
structures.
3.2 Retention
The retention mechanism of a network refers to the inclination towards a given
(future) tie selection based on past decisions and their outcome. This mechanism
stems from either persistent (i.e., slow-decaying) or new, path-dependent ties.
According to sociologist Ronald S. Burt, the decay is a power function of time, in
which decay probability decreases the older a tie and/or node is [52]. However, as
mentioned before, retention also comes from the appearance of path-dependent
ties. As such, while studies on tie-decays analyze the life-span of existing rela-
tionships, another approach is to analyze where the next tie is most likely to
form, even without (significant) change in layout, centrality or density distribu-
tions or even fragmentation [53]. As such, the existing literature on the retention
mechanism describes three main theories, described in what follows.
Preferential attachment This theory states that when creating new ties in
a scale-free network topology [54], agents with a high degree are capable of
increasing their degree even more and at a much faster pace, while agents with
a small degree will inevitably stagnate in the process [55,56]. From this, we can
deduce that well-positioned agents have a clear, accumulative advantage (over
time) compared to the un-connected and peripheral agents [44,57]. However, in
a real-life scenario, this does have a limitation, in that agents can only maintain
a limited number of relationships, and as such, the process of centralization is,
in fact, empirically finite [58].
Embedding This theory suggests that new relationships are formed based on
the trust of the old ones. The increased interconnection to which this leads
is the process of social embedding [44]. As a result, this leads to persistent
network structures, as well as the formation of new mentalities within groups of
interconnected agents [71].
Multi-connectivity This theory pertains to the fact that networks expend by
means of a process meant to induce diversity. Creating multiple independent
ties between them, agents gain a cumulative advantage of multi-connectivity,
and become more attractive for the formation of new relationships [59]. As these
new links form, they reinforce clusters of agents, who become more cohesive over
time. This led Walker [60] et. al. to argue in favor of path-dependence in network
growth [61,62].
As a whole, the previously mentioned theories (i.e., preferential attachment,
embedding and multi-connectivity) represent a cumulative path-dependent re-
tention mechanisms found in networks of various types. Additionally, geograph-
ical location also affects the evolution of the network trajectory [43,63,64,65];
however, the impact is only limited to a certain regional level, where face-to-face
communication is allowed [59]. New relationships are more likely to form when
two agents are located in the same region (i.e., co-located), even if the involved
agents are not central within a given network [66,67]. As a result, there is numer-
ous evidence for retention mechanisms in networks from a geographical point of
view.
Complex networks successfully convey important aspects of cumulative, path-
dependent evolution over time between individual agents as well as between
groups of agents (clusters). However, these retention mechanisms may also lead
to a situation known as local lock-in [11,68], in which certain already-existing
patterns prohibit the appearance of new ones. Lock-ins, however, can be over-
come by the emergence of new variation.
3.3 Variation
As we can see, variation is the result of endogenous network mechanisms for
both tie formation and dissolution. In a network, variation opposes an exist-
ing network trajectory in favor of selection of new ties. As such, even though
variation refers to changes in network structure, it is defined at the level of tie
selection, which in turn, affects the re-organization of the network [69]. Empiri-
cal data has shown that creating and maintaining an active relationship with an
agent outside of ones own network would shorten the given agents membership
duration [70]; it is due to this phenomenon that variations happen in social and
economic networks, which countervail the previously-mentioned retention mech-
anisms. Then again, once such a link is established, the cumulative retention
mechanisms (i.e., preferential attachment, embedding and multi-connectivity)
create new opportunities for new links, thus effectively countering existing pat-
terns of path-dependence [71,72].
4 Conclusions
Evolutionary economic networks are greatly influenced by retention-, and variation-
mechanisms which, in turn, create path-dependent network trajectories [11] by
implicating certain path-dependence attributes (e.g., preferential attachment,
embeddedness, multi-connectivity, etc.) [63]; moreover, evolutionary theory of
economic growth must also be able to explain innovation in regional economic
development. However, since evolutionary theory in fields like economy [8], soci-
ology [73], geography [8,74] is still in its infancy, the observations drawn in this
paper are exploratory only.
As a result of limited application of evolutionary theory, geographers have
turned to network theory from the new domain of social network analysis. As
such, rather than offering a coherent theory pertaining regional evolution, net-
work theory offers a new, evolutionary perspective to economic geography. Of-
fering a way of promoting economic growth and innovation, it also represents
a means to analyze the social values and economic interests between regional
structures and individuals.
The analysis of network evolution, including from an economic point of view,
is important due to the emergence or disappearance of both agents (nodes) and
relationships (ties) simultaneously. As such, when new relationships form, the
causes and consequences of network growth must also be addressed: what is the
relationship between a path-dependent network trajectory and the growth rate
of a network? Apart from this simple question, there are many other questions
(economic) geographers need answers to, however an evolutionary analysis of
changes within a network requires not only relational-, but also longitudinal data
spanning over extensive time-periods [71]. Seeing that this kind of data can only
be analyzed using network theory, it offers a perfect incentive for geographers to
apply methodologies offered only by social network analysis.
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1 Fixed-Period Problems: The Sublinear Case
With this chapter, the preliminaries are over, and we begin the search for periodic
solutions to Hamiltonian systems. All this will be done in the convex case; that
is, we shall study the boundary-value problem
x˙ = JH ′(t, x)
x(0) = x(T )
with H(t, ·) a convex function of x, going to +∞ when ‖x‖ → ∞.
1.1 Autonomous Systems
In this section, we will consider the case when the Hamiltonian H(x) is au-
tonomous. For the sake of simplicity, we shall also assume that it is C1.
We shall first consider the question of nontriviality, within the general frame-
work of (A∞, B∞)-subquadratic Hamiltonians. In the second subsection, we shall
look into the special case when H is (0, b∞)-subquadratic, and we shall try to
derive additional information.
The General Case: Nontriviality. We assume that H is (A∞, B∞)-sub-
quadratic at infinity, for some constant symmetric matrices A∞ and B∞, with
B∞ −A∞ positive definite. Set:
γ : = smallest eigenvalue of B∞ −A∞ (1)
λ : = largest negative eigenvalue of J
d
dt
+A∞ . (2)
Theorem 1 tells us that if λ+ γ < 0, the boundary-value problem:
x˙ = JH ′(x)
x(0) = x(T )
(3)
has at least one solution x, which is found by minimizing the dual action func-
tional:
ψ(u) =
∫ T
o
[
1
2
(
Λ−1o u, u
)
+N∗(−u)
]
dt (4)
on the range of Λ, which is a subspace R(Λ)2L with finite codimension. Here
N(x) := H(x)−
1
2
(A∞x, x) (5)
is a convex function, and
N(x) ≤
1
2
((B∞ −A∞)x, x) + c ∀x . (6)
Proposition 1. Assume H ′(0) = 0 and H(0) = 0. Set:
δ := lim inf
x→0
2N(x) ‖x‖
−2
. (7)
If γ < −λ < δ, the solution u is non-zero:
x(t) 6= 0 ∀t . (8)
Proof. Condition (7) means that, for every δ′ > δ, there is some ε > 0 such that
‖x‖ ≤ ε⇒ N(x) ≤
δ′
2
‖x‖
2
. (9)
It is an exercise in convex analysis, into which we shall not go, to show that
this implies that there is an η > 0 such that
f ‖x‖ ≤ η ⇒ N∗(y) ≤
1
2δ′
‖y‖
2
. (10)
Fig. 1. This is the caption of the figure displaying a white eagle and a white horse on
a snow field
Since u1 is a smooth function, we will have ‖hu1‖∞ ≤ η for h small enough,
and inequality (10) will hold, yielding thereby:
ψ(hu1) ≤
h2
2
1
λ
‖u1‖
2
2
+
h2
2
1
δ′
‖u1‖
2
. (11)
If we choose δ′ close enough to δ, the quantity
(
1
λ +
1
δ′
)
will be negative, and
we end up with
ψ(hu1) < 0 for h 6= 0 small . (12)
On the other hand, we check directly that ψ(0) = 0. This shows that 0 cannot
be a minimizer of ψ, not even a local one. So u 6= 0 and u 6= Λ−1o (0) = 0. ⊓⊔
Corollary 1. Assume H is C2 and (a∞, b∞)-subquadratic at infinity. Let ξ1,
. . . , ξN be the equilibria, that is, the solutions of H
′(ξ) = 0. Denote by ωk the
smallest eigenvalue of H ′′ (ξk), and set:
ω := Min {ω1, . . . , ωk} . (13)
If:
T
2pi
b∞ < −E
[
−
T
2pi
a∞
]
<
T
2pi
ω (14)
then minimization of ψ yields a non-constant T -periodic solution x.
We recall once more that by the integer part E[α] of α ∈ IR, we mean the
a ∈ ZZ such that a < α ≤ a + 1. For instance, if we take a∞ = 0, Corollary 2
tells us that x exists and is non-constant provided that:
T
2pi
b∞ < 1 <
T
2pi
(15)
or
T ∈
(
2pi
ω
,
2pi
b∞
)
. (16)
Proof. The spectrum of Λ is 2piT ZZ + a∞. The largest negative eigenvalue λ is
given by 2piT ko + a∞, where
2pi
T
ko + a∞ < 0 ≤
2pi
T
(ko + 1) + a∞ . (17)
Hence:
ko = E
[
−
T
2pi
a∞
]
. (18)
The condition γ < −λ < δ now becomes:
b∞ − a∞ < −
2pi
T
ko − a∞ < ω − a∞ (19)
which is precisely condition (14). ⊓⊔
Lemma 1. Assume that H is C2 on IR2n\{0} and that H ′′(x) is non-degenerate
for any x 6= 0. Then any local minimizer x˜ of ψ has minimal period T .
Proof. We know that x˜, or x˜ + ξ for some constant ξ ∈ IR2n, is a T -periodic
solution of the Hamiltonian system:
x˙ = JH ′(x) . (20)
There is no loss of generality in taking ξ = 0. So ψ(x) ≥ ψ(x˜) for all x˜ in
some neighbourhood of x in W 1,2
(
IR/TZZ; IR2n
)
.
But this index is precisely the index iT (x˜) of the T -periodic solution x˜ over
the interval (0, T ), as defined in Sect. 2.6. So
iT (x˜) = 0 . (21)
Now if x˜ has a lower period, T/k say, we would have, by Corollary 31:
iT (x˜) = ikT/k(x˜) ≥ kiT/k(x˜) + k − 1 ≥ k − 1 ≥ 1 . (22)
This would contradict (21), and thus cannot happen. ⊓⊔
Notes and Comments. The results in this section are a refined version of [1]; the
minimality result of Proposition 14 was the first of its kind.
To understand the nontriviality conditions, such as the one in formula (16),
one may think of a one-parameter family xT , T ∈
(
2piω−1, 2pib−1
∞
)
of periodic
solutions, xT (0) = xT (T ), with xT going away to infinity when T → 2piω
−1,
which is the period of the linearized system at 0.
Table 1. This is the example table taken out of The TEXbook, p. 246
Year World population
8000 B.C. 5,000,000
50 A.D. 200,000,000
1650 A.D. 500,000,000
1945 A.D. 2,300,000,000
1980 A.D. 4,400,000,000
Theorem 1 (Ghoussoub-Preiss). Assume H(t, x) is (0, ε)-subquadratic at
infinity for all ε > 0, and T -periodic in t
H(t, ·) is convex ∀t (23)
H(·, x) is T−periodic ∀x (24)
H(t, x) ≥ n (‖x‖) with n(s)s−1 →∞ as s→∞ (25)
∀ε > 0 , ∃c : H(t, x) ≤
ε
2
‖x‖
2
+ c . (26)
Assume also that H is C2, and H ′′(t, x) is positive definite everywhere. Then
there is a sequence xk, k ∈ IN, of kT -periodic solutions of the system
x˙ = JH ′(t, x) (27)
such that, for every k ∈ IN, there is some po ∈ IN with:
p ≥ po ⇒ xpk 6= xk . (28)
⊓⊔
Example 1 (External forcing). Consider the system:
x˙ = JH ′(x) + f(t) (29)
where the Hamiltonian H is (0, b∞)-subquadratic, and the forcing term is a
distribution on the circle:
f =
d
dt
F + fo with F ∈ L
2
(
IR/TZZ; IR2n
)
, (30)
where fo := T
−1
∫ T
o f(t)dt. For instance,
f(t) =
∑
k∈IN
δkξ , (31)
where δk is the Dirac mass at t = k and ξ ∈ IR
2n is a constant, fits the pre-
scription. This means that the system x˙ = JH ′(x) is being excited by a series
of identical shocks at interval T .
Definition 1. Let A∞(t) and B∞(t) be symmetric operators in IR
2n, depending
continuously on t ∈ [0, T ], such that A∞(t) ≤ B∞(t) for all t.
A Borelian function H : [0, T ]× IR2n → IR is called (A∞, B∞)-subquadratic
at infinity if there exists a function N(t, x) such that:
H(t, x) =
1
2
(A∞(t)x, x) +N(t, x) (32)
∀t , N(t, x) is convex with respect to x (33)
N(t, x) ≥ n (‖x‖) with n(s)s−1 → +∞ as s→ +∞ (34)
∃c ∈ IR : H(t, x) ≤
1
2
(B∞(t)x, x) + c ∀x . (35)
If A∞(t) = a∞I and B∞(t) = b∞I, with a∞ ≤ b∞ ∈ IR, we shall say that
H is (a∞, b∞)-subquadratic at infinity. As an example, the function ‖x‖
α, with
1 ≤ α < 2, is (0, ε)-subquadratic at infinity for every ε > 0. Similarly, the
Hamiltonian
H(t, x) =
1
2
k ‖k‖2 + ‖x‖α (36)
is (k, k + ε)-subquadratic for every ε > 0. Note that, if k < 0, it is not convex.
Notes and Comments. The first results on subharmonics were obtained by Ra-
binowitz in [5], who showed the existence of infinitely many subharmonics both
in the subquadratic and superquadratic case, with suitable growth conditions
on H ′. Again the duality approach enabled Clarke and Ekeland in [2] to treat
the same problem in the convex-subquadratic case, with growth conditions on
H only.
Recently, Michalek and Tarantello (see [3] and [4]) have obtained lower bound
on the number of subharmonics of period kT , based on symmetry considerations
and on pinching estimates, as in Sect. 5.2 of this article.
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